Originally posted on Coptic Voice, however that site is no longer active. This version is longer and more substantive.
The Tyranny of the Majority is a concept created by Alexis de Tocqueville, which stated that the ruling majority of any democracy will inevitably tyrannize over the minority, if proper infrastructure and checks are not implemented. I have written about this theory, applying it to contemporary Egypt, in relation to the Copts, which demonstrates the validity of Tocqueville's theory. I will condense my paper, showcasing the Tyranny of the Majority in current day Egypt and the possible avenues to combat persecution.
Tocqueville’s Theory of the Tyranny of the Majority:
Alexis de Tocqueville was a 19th century political theorist who exposed a flaw of democratic governments in relation to those who did not consist of the majority. Tocqueville claimed that the essence of democratic regimes consisted of the absolute majority, as there is nothing within democracy to resist it.[1] Although Tocqueville admits that a majority will always predominate over others, he also believed that liberty is endangered if there were no checks on this intense power and that the seeds of tyranny were present.[2]
If there are inadequate securities to protect against tyranny, this becomes democracy’s very weakness,
“[W]hen an individual… is wronged… to whom can he apply for redress? If to public opinion, public opinion constitutes the majority; if to the legislature, it represents the majority, and implicitly obeys its injunctions; if to the executive power, it is appointed by the majority, and remains a passive tool in its hands; the public troops consist of the majority under arms; the jury is the majority invested with the right of hearing judicial cases.”[3]
The tyranny of the majority encompasses both legal and political control, and authority over thought and opinion, or in other words, no freedom of mind.[4]
Tocqueville also noted that the omnipotence of the majority, “….not only led to instances of violence and oppression, but also, more subtly and without physical force, it undermined intellectual independence and the free expression of ideas.”[5]
The removal of the ability, or the will, to think both intellectually and creatively was upsetting to Tocqueville, as this forced the human mind to stop thinking and instead to only obey and adhere to the majority’s norms.[6] This form of oppression, whether explicit or implicit, of the minority occurred more often in localities, away from the central government, where grievances would go unnoticed.
To conclude on Tocqueville, the Tyranny of the Majority can be avoided through proper checks and balances on the majority government and in incorporating the minority into the political sphere, through different allocation of seats within parliament or in the form of lobby groups.
Who are the Coptic People?
The Copts are the indigenous people of the land of Egypt, and North Eastern Africa, where their history dates back to Pharaonic times. The word ‘Coptic’ is derived from the Greek word for Egyptian, ‘Aigyptos’. The language of the Copts is Coptic, the ancient Egyptian demotic language.[7] Egypt had been a polytheistic nation, until Saint Mark the Evangelist established one of the world’s oldest and largest Christian communities in the Middle East and North Africa, dating as far back as 42 AD.[8] Within the first century of the introduction of Christianity, Egypt converted to Christianity.
Religion for the Copts became enmeshed with their cultural identity, as their music and hymns from Pharaonic times were reworded for the Christian message they had received. This change was not only expressed through music, but also in the fasting times of the calendar had become customary to Egyptian life as well as festivals were replaced with feasts for saints.[9] However, the use of the demotic language continued.
In the seventh century, Islam had begun to spread across the Middle East and North Africa and in 641 AD, Egypt had been conquered.[10] The Coptic Christians constituted approximately 80% of the population of Egypt during this time. The early relations between Copts and Muslims were relatively peaceful, as Arabic was being absorbed and the Copts paid a ‘gizya’ tax to guarantee their freedom to practice their religion freely and for civil autonomy, yet they were not full citizens.[11]
Increasingly, tensions grew and in 706 AD, restricting laws were passed, prohibiting the use of ‘Coptic’ in public documents, holding a cross in public, the imposition to wearing distinct clothing, and the ban of public celebrations. Numerous monasteries and churches were destroyed and Copts were banned from holding government positions.[12] Any peaceful protests were met with violent retaliation, a trend that has continued to modern day. With the diminishing number of the Coptic population, their vulnerability increased.
With Egypt’s independence from the monarchy and the British in the twentieth century, Copts began to hope for more equality and integration into Egyptian civil society. Unfortunately, discrimination, marginalization, and violence were still present, if not more apparent, in an increasingly Islamist Egypt.[13] Not finding an outlet for their voice in civil society, the Copts allowed for the church, namely Pope Shenouda III, to deal with state relations.[14]
Despite the, “… many challenges that Copts face both in the form of Muslim preference and a restrictive political environment, they have managed to create a strong and vibrant set of civil society institutions through a combination of communal solidarity, adept political maneuvering, foreign pressure, and operating as a less threatening proxy for the secular opposition.”[15]
Copts in Contemporary Egypt:
Minority Status:
A minority is defined as a group within a broader society that is distinctly different from the majority of society, who often lack access to the power and status held by those who abide by the dominant norms of society, the majority.[16] This is a group that cannot be dominant in a society as their worldviews and values are insufficiently represented, or excluded completely, from the public sphere and societal norms.[17] This leads to the marginalization and disenfranchisement of said group. As religion is often embodied in culture, religious groups are also considered to have a minority status.[18]
The Coptic Christians of Egypt fall under this definition, but this does not contribute to the lack of Copts’ perceived “Egyptian-ness.” It is important to establish the differences between Copts as a social group, as a component of Egyptian national society, and Copts as a religious group, represented by the church.[19] Additionally, not all Copts are of the same social, political, or economic standing. Some fare better than others, but due to their sectarian affiliations, they are regarded as one body, with one voice.[20]
Economic Status:
The economic wellbeing of the Coptic community varies, but predominately this minority is at a disadvantage when compared to the remainder of Egyptian society. A robust contrast of the Coptic elite and rest of the community can be drawn between Naguib Sawiris and the residents of the Mokattam area. The Sawiris family is the wealthiest family in Egypt, and an aim of their business empire is to employ Copts who are disproportionately unemployed (or underemployed) due to government and institutional discrimination.[21] The success of Sawiris’ enterprises is seen as the sole validation that Copts were not discriminated against under the Mubarak regime.[22]
In comparison are the ‘zabaline’ (garbage collectors) of Cairo who live in the Mokattam area, where almost 70,000 Christians live and work collecting and separating garbage. They are victims who fled their homes in Upper Egypt due to harassment and threats. Upon arrival, the authorities told them to “… go to Mokattam, your friends are there already.”[23] Those who live in the Mokattam area amid the garbage reside in one of Cairo’s most disconnected and poor areas, where they are caught in a repressive cycle, as garbage collecting is the only means of employment to them. The poverty of the Copts is not only a difficulty concentrated in the Mokattam but throughout Egypt, mostly in Upper Egypt.
State and Church:
The Copts’ place between the state and society is one of a high connection between the church and regime, where the church would guarantee support for the regime if the regime stood against the ascendancy of the Islamists, or the “Islamic Street” movement.[24] This has created a societal crisis between the nation’s Christian and Muslim groups, as the church became the sole representative of the Copts, which only deepened religious polarization.[25] With government emphasis on Islam as the state religion, tensions and outbursts against the Copts continued to grow.[26]
The Coptic Church under Pope Shenuouda III, and currently Pope Tawadrous II, was the primary voice for Copts in the public sphere, although this trend has begun to change. A distinctive byproduct of the January Revolution was the proliferation of Coptic political participation in the ousting of Mubarak, and later Morsi.[27] Any grievances or demands that the Copts faced were usually confined to the church walls, where the Pope would be the liaison to the government. The Arab Spring changed this dynamic as the unity expressed in January 2011 had given Copts a new sense of political participation, one that they had never been exposed to.[28] This unprecedented momentum propelled the Coptic youth to organize and to demonstrate for other issues pertaining to the Coptic community and representation, as they sensed the rise of dominant Islamist groups.[29]
As the role of the church grew extremely political during the time of the Arab Spring, many Copts felt that the state only engaged with the church, not with them as independent citizens. As mentioned previously, not all Copts’ have their political beliefs in line with the church.[30] As Coptic participation grew during the protests, this demonstrated the autonomy of the people and that the Pope’s stance as the sole legitimate representative of the Coptic citizenry and their political demands was diminishing.[31] Coptic participation during the January Revolution was a testimony to both Muslim and Coptic unity and demonstrated that both identities can and should contribute to the construction of the Egyptian state, yelling...
“Muslims, Christians, One Hand!”
"مسلم, مسيحي, يد واحدة!"[32]
Shortly after the 2011 Revolution, Islamist parties, such as the Salafists and Muslim Brotherhood, had appeared on the political scene. Demanding a new constitution and political system based on the principles of the Quran and whether something was halal or haram.[33] Arguing that Islam was the solution to all problems and that the equality that the Christians yearned for was unharmonious with “Islamic values.”[34] This trend of re-Islamization continued to grow, especially after the parliamentary elections of November 2011 and Presidential elections of 2012.
The growing sense of danger moved the Copts to respond by trying to suppress any communal or personal differences for the sake of defending their identity, while the non-Islamist opposition constantly reaffirmed their support for their Coptic compatriots and disclaimed any tensions between the two groups.[35] However,
“… in the years since the start of the revolution, Egypt has witnessed church burning, attacks, and the murder of over two hundred Copts in their homes and churches by Islamic fundamentalists. The state, especially the governments led by Morsi and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), did not punish the perpetrators.”[36]
These events were not remedied effectively; such instance was after a church burning in Upper Egypt, the SCAF brought a Salafi preacher to the town to ‘calm’ the local Muslims.
During this time, many churches in Upper Egypt were sacked and burned, where numerous Coptic Christians peacefully protested and called for the disbandment of the SCAF and for the removal of Chairman Field Marshal Mohamed Tantawi and the dismissal of the governor of the Province of Aswan.[37] On October 9th, 2011, the Coptic protesters were attacked by military police and tanks outside of the state news and radio building, Maspero. The attack killed dozens and had injured hundreds more.[38] What has now been called the “Maspero Massacre” put further pressure on the SCAF to announce parliamentary elections immediately.
When Morsi won the presidency in 2012, Muslim aggression towards the Copts increased as Morsi stated that, “Egypt is a Muslim country.”[39] With Coptic churches, buildings, stores, and citizens being the targets of these attacks. Coptic youth were angered and frustrated, and refused to accept inferior status in Egypt. No longer relying on the church to advance their political interests and rights, they took to Tahrir Square on June 30th, 2013.[40]
The ousting of Morsi had outraged the Brotherhood and their supporters, and when state security forces dispersed the violent sit-ins, this became an open invitation for retribution against the Christians,
“[m]ore than seventy Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant churches were attacked, many of them looted and then completely demolished. Mobs also destroyed several Christian convents, monasteries, orphanages, schools, home, and shops… Angry mobs took to the streets of Dalga, near Minya, which resulted in injuries and the burning of Christian homes and shops. Hundreds stormed a local church, accusing Copts of treason.”[41]
The Coptic community has often been the scapegoat for the country’s economic and political misfortunes.[42] Even under the rule of El-Sisi, persecution persists but to the less severe extent of that under Mubarak and Morsi.
How Does this Theory Apply to the Copts?
As this paper has established the role of the Copts in historical and contemporary Egypt, it has also asserted the repressive and violent nature the majority has often expressed towards the Christian minority. This Tyranny of the Majority begun during the Islamic conquest of Egypt in 642 AD and has continued until today.
Regardless of political system: monarchy, republic, authoritarian or ‘semi-democratic’, persecution, repression, and disenfranchisement has been all too familiar to the Coptic people.[43]
Tocqueville stated that ‘great political parties’ must be established to contribute to the entire population’s interests and that the safeguarding of political rights for all those the state protects is also a responsibility of the party.[44]
The current division between State and Church is an easy tool that politicians may use to manipulate the religious divide to strengthen their own position. For the Copts, if political diversification were to increase in Egypt, they would begin to stray from the representative nature of church as their sole voice of political dissatisfaction and gravitate to a party that best reflects their beliefs. However, this will take time under El-Sisi’s controversial rule.
If the majority of Egyptian society continues to believe in the inferiority of their Coptic neighbors, persecution will continue. Along with civil society, the majority-elected officials, like Morsi of the politically coherent Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists, will continue to endorse policies that actively seek to cut Copts from the political sphere. In addition to the political repression of the community, the church will continue to be the largest representative of the grievances and demands of the group, where the legal system and police will discard any report the Copts may make on Muslim citizens for harassment or assault. This will only reinforce the political hierarchy of the Coptic Church.
So long as Tocqueville’s Tyranny of the Majority stands, the Coptic people will remain as the nation’s scapegoat in times of economic and political strife, or during any misfortune that the state may fall victim too. This is a major concern as currently Egypt’s economic wellbeing is drastically declining, and with the Brotherhood still opposing the rule of El-Sisi.
Discrimination and persecution against the Coptic community will not cease, as the political and societal culture of division seeks to exploit the gaps between the two major religions.
A route to combat the Tyranny of the Majority is to establish a national identity not associated with religion for all Egyptians to adhere too. To separate religious identity from national identity. Although this is very challenging for the highly religious nation of Egypt, this emancipation from old titles will allow for movement within the political and social sphere of society without any stigma.[45] However, trends are beginning with Coptic and Muslim youth demanding for the secularization of the state, the removal of religion from politics. Finding that common Egyptian identity, as Nasser had attempted to do, will greatly increase national unity and tolerance for the other.[46]
How to Combat this Persecution?
There is hope to combat this persecution and Tyranny, through the use of organized political structure, checks and balances, and representation. Although the current components of democracy in Egypt are rather limited to elections and voting, these are not the sole foundations to a democracy.
Elections are not the main requirement for the establishment of a democratic system, rather, it is a culture, organized structure and state of mind that a democracy requires, all of which are not present in Egypt.[47]
This is not to say that democracy will never be present in Egypt, nor that a military dictatorship or authoritarian regime are the only options in guaranteeing political and human rights. This is to reiterate the notion that,
the Tyranny of the Majority will always seize hold of the government and perceive any minority groups as a threat, religious or other, if there are no safeguards to combat it.[48]
The implementation of ‘real’ democracy would be a profoundly positive change in Egypt, as well as the Middle East and North Africa, far more effective than any coup or uprising. If democracy were to be implemented properly in Egypt, the chances that the government would protect, rather than oppress, its citizens, improve the status of women and minorities, and would overall raise the standard of living increases significantly.[49] It is utopian thinking to believe that Egypt will make the transition to a full liberal democracy immediately, thus, a long-term plan to assist the implementation of democracy is needed.
Some ways that the implementation of democracy may occur in Egypt is through the reformation of the middle class, church and state relations, the removal of religious divides and titles, and the return of the rule of law and human rights promotions.
Conclusion
Understanding the root of the problem is the first step in creating a solution. Although the system in Egypt will not be reformed overnight, the fight and desire for a better society will inevitably lead to it.
Author's Note:
This piece was written back in 2019, it mainly discusses the aftermath of the Egyptian Revolutions and the impact it had on the Coptic Community. Although a period of time has prolapsed, this topic will be revisited. Thank you for your time and readership. - Mary Beshay
[1]Alexis De Tocqueville, Henry Reeve, and John C. Spencer, Democracy in America (New York: J. & H.G. Langley, 1840). Page 258. [2] Alexis De Tocqueville, Henry Reeve, and John C. Spencer, Democracy in America (New York: J. & H.G. Langley, 1840). Page 264. [3] Alexis De Tocqueville, Henry Reeve, and John C. Spencer, Democracy in America (New York: J. & H.G. Langley, 1840). Page 265. [4] James T. Schleifer. The Chicago Companion to Tocqueville's Democracy in America. (University of Chicago Press, 2012). Page 88 - 89. [5] James T. Schleifer. The Chicago Companion to Tocqueville's Democracy in America. (University of Chicago Press, 2012). Page 89. [6] James T. Schleifer. The Chicago Companion to Tocqueville's Democracy in America. (University of Chicago Press, 2012). Page 90. [7] Gregorius, page 58 & Randall P. Henderson, "The Egyptian Coptic Christians: The Conflict between Identity and Equality," Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 16, no. 2 (2005). page 155. [8] Magdi Guirguis. "The Copts and the Egyptian Revolution: Various Attitudes and Dreams. “Social Research 79.2 (2012): 511,530,551. ProQuest. Web. 5 Feb. 2017. page 5. [9] Magdi Guirguis. "The Copts and the Egyptian Revolution: Various Attitudes and Dreams. “Social Research 79.2 (2012): 511,530,551. ProQuest. Web. 5 Feb. 2017. Page 62. [10] Randall P. Henderson, "The Egyptian Coptic Christians: The Conflict between Identity and Equality," Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 16, no. 2 (2005), page 156. [11] Christian Cannuyer and Sophie Hawkes, Coptic Egypt: The Christians of the Nile (London: Thames and Hudson, 2011). Page 61-64. [12] Christian Cannuyer and Sophie Hawkes, Coptic Egypt: The Christians of the Nile (London: Thames and Hudson, 2011). Page 65-67. [13] Paul Rowe, "Building Coptic Civil Society: Christian Groups and the State in Mubarak’s Egypt," Middle Eastern Studies 45, no. 1 (2009). Page 113. [14] Magdi Guirguis. "The Copts and the Egyptian Revolution: Various Attitudes and Dreams. “Social Research 79.2 (2012): 511,530,551. ProQuest. Web. 5 Feb. 2017. Page 512 – 524. [15] Paul Rowe, "Building Coptic Civil Society: Christian Groups and the State in Mubarak’s Egypt," Middle Eastern Studies 45, no. 1 (2009). Page 112. [16] Bessma Momani and Eid Mohamed, Egypt beyond Tahrir Square (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016). Page 96. [17] Bessma Momani and Eid Mohamed, Egypt beyond Tahrir Square (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016). Page 96. [18] Bessma Momani and Eid Mohamed, Egypt beyond Tahrir Square (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016). Page 96. [19] Bessma Momani and Eid Mohamed, Egypt beyond Tahrir Square (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016). Page 96 – 97. [20] Bessma Momani and Eid Mohamed, Egypt beyond Tahrir Square (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016). Page 98. [21] Robert Springborg, Egypt (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2018). Page 125. [22] Robert Springborg, Egypt (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2018). Page 125. [23] Sister Hatune Dogan, "The Garbage People of Mokattam," Hatune Foundation International, Web. [24] Bessma Momani and Eid Mohamed, Egypt beyond Tahrir Square (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016). Page 99-101. [25] Bessma Momani and Eid Mohamed, Egypt beyond Tahrir Square (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016). Page 101 & Randall, page 160. [26] Bahgat Korany and Rabab El-Mahdi, Arab Spring in Egypt: Revolution and beyond (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2014). Page 69. [27] Bessma Momani and Eid Mohamed, Egypt beyond Tahrir Square (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016). Page 95. [28] Bessma Momani and Eid Mohamed, Egypt beyond Tahrir Square (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016). Page 95. [29] Bessma Momani and Eid Mohamed, Egypt beyond Tahrir Square (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016). Page 95 and Korany and El-Mahdi, page 74. [30] Bessma Momani and Eid Mohamed, Egypt beyond Tahrir Square (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016). Page 101-102. [31] Bessma Momani and Eid Mohamed, Egypt beyond Tahrir Square (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016). Page 103. [32]Bessma Momani and Eid Mohamed, Egypt beyond Tahrir Square (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016). Page 103 - 104. [33] Bessma Momani and Eid Mohamed, Egypt beyond Tahrir Square (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016). Page 104 - 105. [34] Bessma Momani and Eid Mohamed, Egypt beyond Tahrir Square (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016). Page 105 – 106 and Bahgat Korany and Rabab El-Mahdi, Arab Spring in Egypt: Revolution and beyond (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2014). Page 68 – 69. [35] Bessma Momani and Eid Mohamed, Egypt beyond Tahrir Square (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016). Page 105 and Bahgat Korany and Rabab El-Mahdi, Arab Spring in Egypt: Revolution and beyond (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2014). Page 69. [36] Bessma Momani and Eid Mohamed, Egypt beyond Tahrir Square (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016). Page 105. [37] Bessma Momani and Eid Mohamed, Egypt beyond Tahrir Square (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016). Page 2. [38] Bessma Momani and Eid Mohamed, Egypt beyond Tahrir Square (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016). Page 2. [39] Bessma Momani and Eid Mohamed, Egypt beyond Tahrir Square (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016). Page 106. [40] Bessma Momani and Eid Mohamed, Egypt beyond Tahrir Square (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016). Page 107 & Ibrahim, web. [41] Bessma Momani and Eid Mohamed, Egypt beyond Tahrir Square (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016). Page 108 -109. [42] Randall P. Henderson, "The Egyptian Coptic Christians: The Conflict between Identity and Equality," Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 16, no. 2 (2005). Page 158. [43] Bahgat Korany and Rabab El-Mahdi, Arab Spring in Egypt: Revolution and beyond (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2014). Page 74 – 75. [44]Seth Cropsey and Arthur Milikh, "Democracy in Egypt: Applying the Tocqueville Standard," World Affairs 174, no. 1 (2011). Page 53. [45] Randall P. Henderson, "The Egyptian Coptic Christians: The Conflict between Identity and Equality," Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 16, no. 2 (2005). Page 106. [46] Randall P. Henderson, "The Egyptian Coptic Christians: The Conflict between Identity and Equality," Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 16, no. 2 (2005). Page 165. [47] Bessma Momani and Eid Mohamed, Egypt beyond Tahrir Square (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016). Page 110. [48] Bessma Momani and Eid Mohamed, Egypt beyond Tahrir Square (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016). Page 111. [49] Seth Cropsey and Arthur Milikh, "Democracy in Egypt: Applying the Tocqueville Standard," World Affairs 174, no. 1 (2011). Page 52.
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